

Name of Organisation	HQ 145 (South) Brigade (HQ 11 th Infantry Brigade and HQ South East (wef 01 Aug 14))
Completed by	Lieutenant Colonel PCE (Philip) Mileham, Joint Regional Liaison Officer
What effect did the adverse weather have on your organisation?	Response to requests from Civil Authorities (CA), starting as result of W Berks declaration of Major Incident on Fri 7 Feb 14, became Main Effort for HQ for 3+ weeks, coordinating (Op PITCHPOLE) response across Hampshire & Isle of Wight (HIOW) and Thames Valley (TV) using 15 units from across Defence. Brigade Ops Room manned 24/7 and normal HQ staff outputs sub-optimal due to focus on providing flood support. Flooding response also had significant impact on wider Defence outputs.
What plans did your organisation have in place beforehand to help manage the impact of the severe weather?	<p>No specific plans as HQ is not, under CCA 04, a Categorised responder, although HQ has role (Defined in JDP-02) to coord and provide support to CAs in circumstances when requests for support are made that warrant assistance.</p> <p>HQ coincidentally had conducted a 3 day UK Ops Combined Arms Staff Trainer (CAST) exercise, Ex RESILIENT ROEBUCK in Nov 13, focussed on a fluvial and coastal flooding scenario in Hampshire!</p>
Of the actions that you had planned, what worked well?	<p>No actions specifically planned, but diverse response to unfolding and dynamic challenges effective in mitigating and preventing flooding impacts.</p> <p>Of note:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Value of established inter-personal linkages with LAs, EA and ‘blue lights’ through regular LRF/JRLO contact underlined and key in this response. In particular communication between JRLO and W Berks Emergency Planning Officer on 7/8 Feb pivotal in enabling timely mobilisation of Defence (7RIFLES) support on 8 Feb. • Brigade Ops Room stood up from 7 - 28 Feb and Defence maintained flexibility to respond in a timely manner to support MA effort. Liaison maintained during Recovery phase. • Early attendance of JRLO and LO from 7 RIFLES at W Berks EOC on Sat 8 Feb enabled, not without challenges being overcome, effective coord of response to crisis at Pingewood SSE sub-station that prevented its loss and attendant impacts.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision with agreement of W Berks to enable use of Chieveley Depot as Defence sand bag filling hub for Thames Valley. • Defence established key LO linkage and communication with LA TCGs/EOCs as well as GOLD. In addition LO team deployed to EA Regional Office at Wallingford on Sat 8 Feb. • Defence exercised 'Mission Command' enabling coordination at highest (Strategic) levels and decisions and effect at lowest (Operational/Tactical) levels. This involved formation of Sectors across Thames Valley and HIOW. • Defence able to pro-actively seek work and not just react to requests, but mindful that civil agencies maintained lead. • Formal MACA processes suspended and as result response more timely and agile, particularly as uncertainties surrounding potential costs of Defence support suspended. • Defence demonstrated it is only 'national' asset able to provide effective and timely response to reinforce MA effort in such circumstances. • Defence has effect of galvanising and increasing effect of civil response. • Employment of local Army Reserve unit (7 RIFLES) worked well and has benefited future Community Engagement in Berks/South Oxfordshire. • Defence able to mitigate risks through coordination with other agencies (e.g. RBFRS Water Rescue Team and TVP providing lighting that enabled 24/7 work in hazardous surroundings) . • HQ able to augment own manpower from Reservists, but is challenged in being able to provide LO teams to every TCG/EOC during wide area response (e.g. Berks having 6 LAs presented particular challenge!)
<p>What worked less well or would you change for future events and why?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uncertainty surrounding costs needs to be clarified and communicated at earliest opportunity. • In early stages of flooding evident that weak comms between EA, SSE and W.Berks resulted in lack of SA and sub-optimal response that could have resulted in loss of Pingewood sub-station. • Defence cannot be relied upon to provide lift capacity (of bulk sandbags) due to Whole Fleet Management. LAs need to identify hauliers and other contractors who may be able to assist. • Defence able to provide and fill some 180,000 empty sandbags for Thames Valley to EA and LAs. This resource must not be relied upon in future and EA/LAs require to hold greater stocks and have effective supply chain of this key resource. Some parochialism encountered between

	<p>LAs around supply of and distribution of sand/sand bags in early stages of response. W Berks should consider establishing Log Cell within EOC to coord sandbags etc.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• EA struggled to prioritise and resource protect tasks for Defence in early stages. This resulted in Defence assets not being employed effectively on 9-10 Feb.• Situational awareness of all agencies across W Berks and TV in early stages of flooding response.• Defence personnel lacked sufficient PPE in early stages.
What changes, if any, were made to your plan in response to events and what effect did they have?	Once sufficient force elements generated, HQ developed and employed Sector model to enable Mission Command.
Please outline any other comments that you may have for the Commission.	